Para
matar um programa com o comando kill é preciso do número PID do
processo, para conseguir o número PID, ou você usa pidof programa ou
lista todos os processos e olha o PID do programa que te interessa. E
se você quiser finalizar todos os processos de um determinado usuário ?
E se tiver mais de um número de PID referente aquele processo (como o
apache) ?

Uma solução vem do comando abaixo:

ps auxww | grep “mitre” | awk ‘{print $2}’

Com ele, nós listamos todos os PID do usuario mitre. Ainda podemos com a modificação do comando abaixo:

ps auxww | grep “apache” | awk ‘{print $2}’

listar todos os processos que contenham a expressão regular “apache”.

Essencialmente, podemos listar todos os PIDs de qualquer processo que possa ser
identificado por uma expressão regular apropriada como argumento do comando intermediário “grep”.

Assim para converter UTF-8 para ISO-8859-1 temos:

Para o contrário utilizamos:

É necessário redirecionar a saida de arquivo para algum lugar, algo como:

Sendo assim, eu acrescentei ao meu ~/.bashrc* as seguintes linhas

Agora quando eu quiser converter um tipo de arquivo em outro, eu só preciso usar o iso2utf ou o utf2iso

Para criar um pacote .deb faça:

1. Crie um diretório com o nome do pacote
2. Crie, no novo diretório, toda a estrutura de diretórios do seu pacote
3. Crie o diretório de nome “DEBIAN” dentro do diretório debian criado
previamente. No diretório DEBIAN, estarão os arquivos com as informações
de controle do pacote.
4. Dentro do diretório DEBIAN, crie um arquivo de texto chamado control.
Este arquivo conterá as informações de controle do pacote Debian.
Basicamente, os seguintes campos descrevem as informações do arquivo
control:

Package: nome do pacote com o nome da versão;

Priority:
grau de prioridade do pacote. Indica se o pacote é estritamente
essencial para o funcionamento do sistema ou não;

Version:
número de versão. Modifique este campo toda vez que for
criado uma nova versão do programa correspondente ao pacote
sendo criado;

Architecture: arquitetura de hardware para a qual o programa foi desenvolvido (por exemplo, i386 para processadores);

Mantainer: nome e e-mail do responsável pela manutenção do pacote;

Depends:
listagem com os nomes de outros pacotes Debian, dos quais o pacote
sendo construído depende. Caso haja mais de uma
dependência, separe cada uma com uma vírgula. Pode-se
ainda especificar quais versões das dependências
são aplicáveis ao pacote sendo construído. Para
tanto, depois do nome de uma dependência, defina entre
parênteses um operador de relação (operadores
possíveis: <<, <=, =, >= and >>) e o
número de versão da dependência.

Description: breve descrição do pacote.

5.Depois
de preencher este arquivo /DEBIAN/control e verificar se todos os
arquivos estão nos lugares corretos, use o comando “dpkg-deb -b”
para gerar o pacote. Basta fornecer o diretório onde
estão os arquivos do pacote e o nome do arquivo que será
criado

echo -e “==================================================================================”
echo -e “================ ATENÇÂO =====================================================”\\n
echo -e “Este script vai fazer a atualização do Clamav Anti-Vírus para versão mais recente”
echo -e “e instalar o F-prot Anti-vírus.”\\n
echo -e “============================================= Versão $VERSAO ==========”\\n

echo “Pressione ENTER para prosseguir”
read p

echo -e \\n
echo -e “Iremos agora fazer a atualização do Clamav Anti-virus.”\\n

echo -e “Fazendo backup do /etc/apt/sources.list para /etc/apt/sources.list_ORIGINAL”\\n

if (test -f /etc/apt/sources.list_ORIGINAL)
then
echo “Arquivo de backup já Existe”
else
echo “Criando backup:”
echo “cp /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list_ORIGINAL”
cp /etc/apt/sources.list /etc/apt/sources.list_ORIGINAL
fi

#cat /etc/apt/sources.list
#deb ftp://ftp.uk.debian.org/debian/ testing main
#EOF
cat > /etc/apt/sources.list
#Clamav Binary packages for Debian stable/sarge:
deb http://ftp2.de.debian.org/debian-volatile sarge/volatile main
EOF

echo -e \\n
echo -e “Fazendo a atualização do anti-virus”\\n

apt-get update
apt-get install clamav clamav-daemon
freshclam

echo -e \\n
echo -e “Agora, precisamos instalar uma nova versão do kernel, porque durante a instalação”
echo -e “da versão nova do Clamav, ele tentou remover a versão mais antiga do kernel.”\\n
echo -e “Instalaremos a versão kernel-image-2.4.27-3-386 e mais alguns pacotes que também foram removidos”\\n

apt-get install kernel-image-2.4.27-2-386 kernel-image-2.4.27-3-386 base-config initrd-tools libgmp3

echo -e \\n
echo -e “OK, seu sistema foi atualizado.”\\n

echo -e “Instalando um anti-vírus adicional, o F-Prot”\\n

cd /tmp
wget http://http.us.debian.org/debian/pool/contrib/f/f-prot-installer/f-prot-installer_0.5.22_i386.deb

apt-get install libwww-perl liburi-perl libhtml-parser-perl libhtml-tree-perl libhtml-tagset-perl

dpkg -i f-prot-installer_0.5.22_i386.deb

echo -e \\n
echo -e “Gerando uma entrado no crontab para que o F-Prot se atualize”\\n

echo /etc/cron.d/f-prot-installer
#
27 4,16 * * * root if [ -x /usr/lib/f-prot/tools/check-updates ]; then /usr/lib/f-prot/tools/check-updates -cron; fi
#
# Uncomment to check for new version of program once a week
#
00 12 * * 1 root if [ -x /usr/sbin/update-f-prot ]; then /usr/sbin/update-f-prot -i; fi
EOF

echo -e “Alterando o /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf para dar suporte ao F-Prot”\\n

#echo “Pressione ENTER para prosseguir”
#read p

echo -e “Fazendo backup do /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf para /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf_OLD”\\n

if (test -f /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf_OLD)
then
echo “Arquivo de backup já Existe”
else
echo “Criando backup:”
echo “mv /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf_OLD”
mv /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf_OLD
fi

cat /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf
use strict;

# Configuration file for amavisd-new
# Defaults modified for the Debian amavisd-new package
# \$Id: amavisd.conf,v 1.27.2.2 2004/11/18 23:27:55 hmh Exp \$
#
# This software is licensed under the GNU General Public License (GPL).
# See comments at the start of amavisd-new for the whole license text.

#Sections:
# Section I – Essential daemon and MTA settings
# Section II – MTA specific
# Section III – Logging
# Section IV – Notifications/DSN, BOUNCE/REJECT/DROP/PASS destiny, quarantine
# Section V – Per-recipient and per-sender handling, whitelisting, etc.
# Section VI – Resource limits
# Section VII – External programs, virus scanners, SpamAssassin
# Section VIII – Debugging

#GENERAL NOTES:
# This file is a normal Perl code, interpreted by Perl itself.
# – make sure this file (or directory where it resides) is NOT WRITABLE
# by mere mortals (not even vscan/amavis; best to make it owned by root),
# otherwise it represents a severe security risk!
# – for values which are interpreted as booleans, it is recommended
# to use 1 for true, undef for false.
# THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM OLD AMAVIS VERSIONS where “no” also meant false,
# now it means true, like any nonempty string does!
# – Perl syntax applies. Most notably: strings in “” may include variables
# (which start with \$ or @); to include characters @ and \$ in double
# quoted strings, precede them by a backslash; in single-quoted strings
# the \$ and @ lose their special meaning, so it is usually easier to use
# single quoted strings (or qw operator) for e-mail addresses.
# Still, in both cases a backslash needs to be doubled.
# – variables with names starting with a ‘@’ are lists, the values assigned
# to them should be lists as well, e.g. (‘one@foo’, \$mydomain, “three”);
# note the comma-separation and parenthesis. If strings in the list
# do not contain spaces nor variables, a Perl operator qw() may be used
# as a shorthand to split its argument on whitespace and produce a list
# of strings, e.g. qw( one@foo example.com three ); Note that the argument
# to qw is quoted implicitly and no variable interpretation is done within
# (no ‘\$’ variable evaluations). The #-initiated comments can NOT be used
# within a string. In other words, \$ and # lose their special meaning
# within a qw argument, just like within ‘…’ strings.
# – all e-mail addresses in this file and as used internally by the daemon
# are in their raw (rfc2821-unquoted and non-bracketed) form, i.e.
# Bob “Funny” Dude@example.com, not: “Bob \”Funny\” Dude”@example.com
# and not ; also: ” and not ”.
# – the term ‘default value’ in examples below refers to the value of a
# variable pre-assigned to it by the program; any explicit assignment
# to a variable in this configuration file overrides the default value;

#
# Section I – Essential daemon and MTA settings
#

# \$MYHOME serves as a quick default for some other configuration settings.
# More refined control is available with each individual setting further down.
# \$MYHOME is not used directly by the program. No trailing slash!
\$MYHOME = ‘/var/lib/amavis’; # (default is ‘/var/amavis’)

# \$mydomain serves as a quick default for some other configuration settings.
# More refined control is available with each individual setting further down.
# \$mydomain is never used directly by the program.
\$mydomain = ‘example.com’; # (no useful default)

# \$myhostname = ‘host.example.com’; # fqdn of this host, default by uname(3)

# Set the user and group to which the daemon will change if started as root
# (otherwise just keeps the UID unchanged, and these settings have no effect):
\$daemon_user = ‘amavis’; # (no default (undef))
\$daemon_group = ‘amavis’; # (no default (undef))

# Runtime working directory (cwd), and a place where
# temporary directories for unpacking mail are created.
# if you change this, you might want to modify the cleanup()
# function in /etc/init.d/amavisd-new
# (no trailing slash, may be a scratch file system)
\$TEMPBASE = \$MYHOME; # (must be set if other config vars use is)
#\$TEMPBASE = “\$MYHOME/tmp”; # prefer to keep home dir /var/amavis clean?

# \$helpers_home sets environment variable HOME, and is passed as option
# ‘home_dir_for_helpers’ to Mail::SpamAssassin::new. It should be a directory
# on a normal persistent file system, not a scratch or temporary file system
#\$helpers_home = \$MYHOME; # (defaults to \$MYHOME)

# Run the daemon in the specified chroot jail if nonempty:
#\$daemon_chroot_dir = \$MYHOME; # (default is undef, meaning: do not chroot)

\$pid_file = “/var/run/amavis/amavisd.pid”; # (default: “\$MYHOME/amavisd.pid”)
\$lock_file = “/var/run/amavis/amavisd.lock”; # (default: “\$MYHOME/amavisd.lock”)

# set environment variables if you want (no defaults):
\$ENV{TMPDIR} = \$TEMPBASE; # wise to set TMPDIR, but not obligatory
#…

# MTA SETTINGS, UNCOMMENT AS APPROPRIATE,
# both \$forward_method and \$notify_method default to ‘smtp:127.0.0.1:10025′

# POSTFIX, or SENDMAIL in dual-MTA setup, or EXIM V4
# (set host and port number as required; host can be specified
# as IP address or DNS name (A or CNAME, but MX is ignored)
#\$forward_method = ‘smtp:127.0.0.1:10025′; # where to forward checked mail
#\$notify_method = \$forward_method; # where to submit notifications

# NOTE: The defaults (above) are good for Postfix or dual-sendmail. You MUST
# uncomment the appropriate settings below if using other setups!

# SENDMAIL MILTER, using amavis-milter.c helper program:
# SEE amavisd-new-milter package docs FOR DEBIAN INSTRUCTIONS
#\$forward_method = undef; # no explicit forwarding, sendmail does it by itself
# milter; option -odd is needed to avoid deadlocks
#\$notify_method = ‘pipe:flags=q argv=/usr/sbin/sendmail -Ac -i -odd -f \${sender} — \${recipient}’;
# just a thought: can we use use -Am instead of -odd ?

# SENDMAIL (old non-milter setup, as relay):
#\$forward_method = ‘pipe:flags=q argv=/usr/sbin/sendmail -C/etc/sendmail.orig.cf -i -f \${sender} — \${recipient}’;
#\$notify_method = \$forward_method;

# SENDMAIL (old non-milter setup, amavis.c calls local delivery agent):
#\$forward_method = undef; # no explicit forwarding, amavis.c will call LDA
#\$notify_method = ‘pipe:flags=q argv=/usr/sbin/sendmail -Ac -i -f \${sender} — \${recipient}’;

# EXIM v3 (not recommended with v4 or later, which can use SMTP setup instead):
#\$forward_method = ‘pipe:flags=q argv=/usr/sbin/exim -oMr scanned-ok -i -f \${sender} — \${recipient}’;
#\$notify_method = \$forward_method;

# prefer to collect mail for forwarding as BSMTP files?
#\$forward_method = “bsmtp:\$MYHOME/out-%i-%n.bsmtp”;
#\$notify_method = \$forward_method;

# Net::Server pre-forking settings
# You may want \$max_servers to match the width of your MTA pipe
# feeding amavisd, e.g. with Postfix the ‘Max procs’ field in the
# master.cf file, like the ’2′ in the: smtp-amavis unix – - n – 2 smtp
#
\$max_servers = 2; # number of pre-forked children (default 2)
\$max_requests = 10; # retire a child after that many accepts (default 10)

\$child_timeout=5*60; # abort child if it does not complete each task in n sec
# (default: 8*60 seconds)

# Check also the settings of @av_scanners at the end if you want to use
# virus scanners. If not, you may want to delete the whole long assignment
# to the variable @av_scanners, which will also remove the virus checking
# code (e.g. if you only want to do spam scanning).

# Here is a QUICK WAY to completely DISABLE some sections of code
# that WE DO NOT WANT (it won’t even be compiled-in).
# For more refined controls leave the following two lines commented out,
# and see further down what these two lookup lists really mean.
#
# @bypass_virus_checks_acl = qw( . ); # uncomment to DISABLE anti-virus code
# @bypass_spam_checks_acl = qw( . ); # uncomment to DISABLE anti-spam code
#
# Any setting can be changed with a new assignment, so make sure
# you do not unintentionally override these settings further down!
@bypass_spam_checks_acl = qw( . ); # No default dependency on spamassassin

# Lookup list of local domains (see README.lookups for syntax details)
#
# NOTE:
# For backwards compatibility the variable names @local_domains (old) and
# @local_domains_acl (new) are synonyms. For consistency with other lookups
# the name @local_domains_acl is now preferred. It also makes it more
# obviously distinct from the new %local_domains hash lookup table.
#
# local_domains* lookup tables are used in deciding whether a recipient
# is local or not, or in other words, if the message is outgoing or not.
# This affects inserting spam-related headers for local recipients,
# limiting recipient virus notifications (if enabled) to local recipients,
# in deciding if address extension may be appended, and in SQL lookups
# for non-fqdn addresses. Set it up correctly if you need features
# that rely on this setting (or just leave empty otherwise).
#
# With Postfix (2.0) a quick reminder on what local domains normally are:
# a union of domains specified in: \$mydestination, \$virtual_alias_domains,
# \$virtual_mailbox_domains, and \$relay_domains.
#
@local_domains_acl = ( “.\$mydomain” ); # \$mydomain and its subdomains
# @local_domains_acl = ( “.\$mydomain”, “my.other.domain” );
# @local_domains_acl = qw(); # default is empty, no recipient treated as local
# @local_domains_acl = qw( .example.com );
# @local_domains_acl = qw( .example.com !host.sub.example.net .sub.example.net );

# or alternatively(A), using a Perl hash lookup table, which may be assigned
# directly, or read from a file, one domain per line; comments and empty lines
# are ignored, a dot before a domain name implies its subdomains:
#
#read_hash(\%local_domains, ‘/etc/amavis/local_domains’);

#or alternatively(B), using a list of regular expressions:
# \$local_domains_re = new_RE( qr’[@.]example\.com\$’i );
#
# see README.lookups for syntax and semantics

#
# Section II – MTA specific (defaults should be ok)
#

# if \$relayhost_is_client is true, the IP address in \$notify_method and
# \$forward_method is dynamically overridden with SMTP client peer address
# (if available), which makes it possible for several hosts to share one
# daemon. The static port number is also overridden, and is dynamically
# calculated as being one above the incoming SMTP/LMTP session port number.
#
# These are logged at level 3, so enable logging until you know you got it
# right.
\$relayhost_is_client = 0; # (defaults to false)

\$insert_received_line = 1; # behave like MTA: insert ‘Received:’ header
# (does not apply to sendmail/milter)
# (default is true (1) )

# AMAVIS-CLIENT PROTOCOL INPUT SETTINGS (e.g. with sendmail milter)
# (used with amavis helper clients like amavis-milter.c and amavis.c,
# NOT needed for Postfix and Exim or dual-sendmail – keep it undefined.)
#\$unix_socketname = “/var/lib/amavis/amavisd.sock”; # amavis helper protocol socket
\$unix_socketname = undef; # disable listening on a unix socket
# (default is undef, i.e. disabled)

# Do we receive quoted or raw addresses from the helper program?
# (does not apply to SMTP; defaults to true)
#\$gets_addr_in_quoted_form = 1; # “Bob \”Funny\” Dude”@example.com
#\$gets_addr_in_quoted_form = 0; # Bob “Funny” Dude@example.com

# SMTP SERVER (INPUT) PROTOCOL SETTINGS (e.g. with Postfix, Exim v4, …)
# (used when MTA is configured to pass mail to amavisd via SMTP or LMTP)
\$inet_socket_port = 10024; # accept SMTP on this local TCP port
# (default is undef, i.e. disabled)
# multiple ports may be provided: \$inet_socket_port = [10024, 10026, 10028];

# SMTP SERVER (INPUT) access control
# – do not allow free access to the amavisd SMTP port !!!
#
# when MTA is at the same host, use the following (one or the other or both):
\$inet_socket_bind = ’127.0.0.1′; # limit socket bind to loopback interface
# (default is ’127.0.0.1′)
@inet_acl = qw( 127.0.0.1 ); # allow SMTP access only from localhost IP
# (default is qw( 127.0.0.1 ) )

# when MTA (one or more) is on a different host, use the following:
# @inet_acl = qw(127/8 10.1.0.1 10.1.0.2); # adjust the list as appropriate
# \$inet_socket_bind = undef; # bind to all IP interfaces if undef
#
# Example1:
# @inet_acl = qw( 127/8 10/8 172.16/12 192.168/16 );
# permit only SMTP access from loopback and rfc1918 private address space
#
# Example2:
# @inet_acl = qw( !192.168.1.12 172.16.3.3 !172.16.3/255.255.255.0
# 127.0.0.1 10/8 172.16/12 192.168/16 );
# matches loopback and rfc1918 private address space except host 192.168.1.12
# and net 172.16.3/24 (but host 172.16.3.3 within 172.16.3/24 still matches)
#
# Example3:
# @inet_acl = qw( 127/8
# !172.16.3.0 !172.16.3.127 172.16.3.0/25
# !172.16.3.128 !172.16.3.255 172.16.3.128/25 );
# matches loopback and both halves of the 172.16.3/24 C-class,
# split into two subnets, except all four broadcast addresses
# for these subnets
#
# See README.lookups for details on specifying access control lists.

#
# Section III – Logging
#

# true (e.g. 1) => syslog; false (e.g. 0) => logging to file
\$DO_SYSLOG = 1; # (defaults to false)
#\$SYSLOG_LEVEL = ‘user.info’; # (facility.priority, default ‘mail.info’)

# Log file (if not using syslog)
\$LOGFILE = “/var/log/amavis.log”; # (defaults to empty, no log)

#NOTE: levels are not strictly observed and are somewhat arbitrary
# 0: startup/exit/failure messages, viruses detected
# 1: args passed from client, some more interesting messages
# 2: virus scanner output, timing
# 3: server, client
# 4: decompose parts
# 5: more debug details
#\$log_level = 2; # (defaults to 0)

# Customizable template for the most interesting log file entry (e.g. with
# \$log_level=0) (take care to properly quote Perl special characters like ‘\’)
# For a list of available macros see README.customize .

# only log infected messages (useful with log level 0):
# \$log_templ = ‘[? %#V |[? %#F ||banned filename ([%F|,])]|infected ([%V|,])]#
# [? %#V |[? %#F ||, from=[?%o|(?)|], to=[|,][? %i ||, quarantine %i]]#
# |, from=[?%o|(?)|], to=[|,][? %i ||, quarantine %i]]’;

# log both infected and noninfected messages (default):
\$log_templ = ‘[? %#V |[? %#F |[?%#D|Not-Delivered|Passed]|BANNED name/type (%F)]|INFECTED (%V)], #
[?%o|(?)|] -> [|,][? %i ||, quarantine %i], Message-ID: %m, Hits: %c’;

#
# Section IV – Notifications/DSN, BOUNCE/REJECT/DROP/PASS destiny, quarantine
#

# Select notifications text encoding when Unicode-aware Perl is converting
# text from internal character representation to external encoding (charset
# in MIME terminology). Used as argument to Perl Encode::encode subroutine.
#
# to be used in RFC 2047-encoded header field bodies, e.g. in Subject:
#\$hdr_encoding = ‘iso-8859-1′; # (default: ‘iso-8859-1′)
#
# to be used in notification body text: its encoding and Content-type.charset
#\$bdy_encoding = ‘iso-8859-1′; # (default: ‘iso-8859-1′)

# Default template texts for notifications may be overruled by directly
# assigning new text to template variables, or by reading template text
# from files. A second argument may be specified in a call to read_text(),
# specifying character encoding layer to be used when reading from the
# external file, e.g. ‘utf8′, ‘iso-8859-1′, or often just \$bdy_encoding.
# Text will be converted to internal character representation by Perl 5.8.0
# or later; second argument is ignored otherwise. See PerlIO::encoding,
# Encode::PerlIO and perluniintro man pages.
#
# \$notify_sender_templ = read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_sender.txt’);
# \$notify_virus_sender_templ= read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_virus_sender.txt’);
# \$notify_virus_admin_templ = read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_virus_admin.txt’);
# \$notify_virus_recips_templ= read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_virus_recips.txt’);
# \$notify_spam_sender_templ = read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_spam_sender.txt’);
# \$notify_spam_admin_templ = read_text(‘/var/amavis/notify_spam_admin.txt’);

# If notification template files are collectively available in some directory,
# use read_l10n_templates which calls read_text for each known template.
#
# read_l10n_templates(‘/etc/amavis/en_US’);
#
# Debian available locales: en_US, pt_BR, de_DE, it_IT
read_l10n_templates(‘en_US’, ‘/etc/amavis’);

# Here is an overall picture (sequence of events) of how pieces fit together
# (only virus controls are shown, spam controls work the same way):
#
# bypass_virus_checks? ==> PASS
# no viruses? ==> PASS
# log virus if \$log_templ is nonempty
# quarantine if \$virus_quarantine_to is nonempty
# notify admin if \$virus_admin (lookup) nonempty
# notify recips if \$warnvirusrecip and (recipient is local or \$warn_offsite)
# add address extensions if adding extensions is enabled and virus will pass
# send (non-)delivery notifications
# to sender if DSN needed (BOUNCE or (\$warn_virus_sender and D_PASS))
# virus_lovers or final_destiny==D_PASS ==> PASS
# DISCARD (2xx) or REJECT (5xx) (depending on final_*_destiny)
#
# Equivalent flow diagram applies for spam checks.
# If a virus is detected, spam checking is skipped entirely.

# The following symbolic constants can be used in *destiny settings:
#
# D_PASS mail will pass to recipients, regardless of bad contents;
#
# D_DISCARD mail will not be delivered to its recipients, sender will NOT be
# notified. Effectively we lose mail (but will be quarantined
# unless disabled). Losing mail is not decent for a mailer,
# but might be desired.
#
# D_BOUNCE mail will not be delivered to its recipients, a non-delivery
# notification (bounce) will be sent to the sender by amavisd-new;
# Exception: bounce (DSN) will not be sent if a virus name matches
# \$viruses_that_fake_sender_re, or to messages from mailing lists
# (Precedence: bulk|list|junk);
#
# D_REJECT mail will not be delivered to its recipients, sender should
# preferably get a reject, e.g. SMTP permanent reject response
# (e.g. with milter), or non-delivery notification from MTA
# (e.g. Postfix). If this is not possible (e.g. different recipients
# have different tolerances to bad mail contents and not using LMTP)
# amavisd-new sends a bounce by itself (same as D_BOUNCE).
#
# Notes:
# D_REJECT and D_BOUNCE are similar, the difference is in who is responsible
# for informing the sender about non-delivery, and how informative
# the notification can be (amavisd-new knows more than MTA);
# With D_REJECT, MTA may reject original SMTP, or send DSN (delivery status
# notification, colloquially called ‘bounce’) – depending on MTA;
# Best suited for sendmail milter, especially for spam.
# With D_BOUNCE, amavisd-new (not MTA) sends DSN (can better explain the
# reason for mail non-delivery, but unable to reject the original
# SMTP session). Best suited to reporting viruses, and for Postfix
# and other dual-MTA setups, which can’t reject original client SMTP
# session, as the mail has already been enqueued.

\$final_virus_destiny = D_DISCARD; # (defaults to D_BOUNCE)
\$final_banned_destiny = D_BOUNCE; # (defaults to D_BOUNCE)
\$final_spam_destiny = D_REJECT; # (defaults to D_REJECT)
\$final_bad_header_destiny = D_PASS; # (defaults to D_PASS), D_BOUNCE suggested

# Alternatives to consider for spam:
# – use D_PASS if clients will do filtering based on inserted mail headers;
# – use D_DISCARD, if kill_level is set safely high;
# – use D_BOUNCE instead of D_REJECT if not using milter;
#
# D_BOUNCE is preferred for viruses, but consider:
# – use D_DISCARD to avoid bothering the rest of the network, it is hopeless
# to try to keep up with the viruses that faker the envelope sender anyway,
# and bouncing only increases the network cost of viruses for everyone
# – use D_PASS (or virus_lovers) and \$warnvirussender=1 to deliver viruses;
# – use D_REJECT instead of D_BOUNCE if using milter and under heavy
# virus storm;
#
# Don’t bother to set both D_DISCARD and \$warn*sender=1, it will get mapped
# to D_BOUNCE.
#
# The separation of *_destiny values into D_BOUNCE, D_REJECT, D_DISCARD
# and D_PASS made settings \$warnvirussender and \$warnspamsender only still
# useful with D_PASS.

# The following \$warn*sender settings are ONLY used when mail is
# actually passed to recipients (\$final_*_destiny=D_PASS, or *_lovers*).
# Bounces or rejects produce non-delivery status notification anyway.

# Notify virus sender?
#\$warnvirussender = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))

# Notify spam sender?
#\$warnspamsender = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))

# Notify sender of banned files?
#\$warnbannedsender = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))

# Notify sender of syntactically invalid header containing non-ASCII characters?
#\$warnbadhsender = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))

# Notify virus (or banned files) RECIPIENT?
# (not very useful, but some policies demand it)
#\$warnvirusrecip = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))
#\$warnbannedrecip = 1; # (defaults to false (undef))

# Notify also non-local virus/banned recipients if \$warn*recip is true?
# (including those not matching local_domains*)
#\$warn_offsite = 1; # (defaults to false (undef), i.e. only notify locals)

# Treat envelope sender address as unreliable and don’t send sender
# notification / bounces if name(s) of detected virus(es) match the list.
# Note that virus names are supplied by external virus scanner(s) and are
# not standardized, so virus names may need to be adjusted.
# See README.lookups for syntax, check also README.policy-on-notifications
#
\$viruses_that_fake_sender_re = new_RE(
qr’nimda|hybris|klez|bugbear|yaha|braid|sobig|fizzer|palyh|peido|holar’i,
qr’tanatos|lentin|bridex|mimail|trojan\.dropper|dumaru|parite|spaces’i,
qr’dloader|galil|gibe|swen|netwatch|bics|sbrowse|sober|rox|val(hal)?la’i,
qr’frethem|sircam|be?agle|tanx|mydoom|novarg|shimg|netsky|somefool|moodown’i,
qr’@mm|@MM’, # mass mailing viruses as labeled by f-prot and uvscan
qr’Worm’i, # worms as labeled by ClamAV, Kaspersky, etc
[qr'^(EICAR|Joke\.|Junk\.)'i => 0],
[qr'^(WM97|OF97|W95/CIH-|JS/Fort)'i => 0],
[qr/.*/ => 1], # true by default (remove or comment-out if undesired)
);

# where to send ADMIN VIRUS NOTIFICATIONS (should be a fully qualified address)
# – the administrator address may be a simple fixed e-mail address (a scalar),
# or may depend on the SENDER address (e.g. its domain), in which case
# a ref to a hash table can be specified (specify lower-cased keys,
# dot is a catchall, see README.lookups).
#
# Empty or undef lookup disables virus admin notifications.

# \$virus_admin = undef; # do not send virus admin notifications (default)
# \$virus_admin = {‘not.example.com’ => ”, ‘.’ => ‘virusalert@example.com’};
# \$virus_admin = ‘virus-admin@example.com’;
\$virus_admin = “postmaster\@\$mydomain”; # due to D_DISCARD default

# equivalent to \$virus_admin, but for spam admin notifications:
# \$spam_admin = “spamalert\@\$mydomain”;
# \$spam_admin = undef; # do not send spam admin notifications (default)
# \$spam_admin = {‘not.example.com’ => ”, ‘.’ => ‘spamalert@example.com’};

#advanced example, using a hash lookup table:
#\$virus_admin = {
# ‘baduser@sub1.example.com’ => ‘HisBoss@sub1.example.com’,
# ‘.sub1.example.com’ => ‘virusalert@sub1.example.com’,
# ‘.sub2.example.com’ => ”, # don’t send admin notifications
# ‘a.sub3.example.com’ => ‘abuse@sub3.example.com’,
# ‘.sub3.example.com’ => ‘virusalert@sub3.example.com’,
# ‘.example.com’ => ‘noc@example.com’, # catchall for our virus senders
# ‘.’ => ‘virusalert@hq.example.com’, # catchall for the rest
#};

# whom notification reports are sent from (ENVELOPE SENDER);
# may be a null reverse path, or a fully qualified address:
# (admin and recip sender addresses default to \$mailfrom
# for compatibility, which in turn defaults to undef (empty) )
# If using strings in double quotes, don’t forget to quote @, i.e. \@
#
#\$mailfrom_notify_admin = “virusalert\@\$mydomain”;
#\$mailfrom_notify_recip = “virusalert\@\$mydomain”;
#\$mailfrom_notify_spamadmin = “spam.police\@\$mydomain”;

# ‘From’ HEADER FIELD for sender and admin notifications.
# This should be a replyable address, see rfc1894. Not to be confused
# with \$mailfrom_notify_sender, which is the envelope return address
# and should be empty (null reverse path) according to rfc2821.
#
# The syntax of the ‘From’ header field is specified in rfc2822, section
# ’3.4. Address Specification’. Note in particular that display-name must be
# a quoted-string if it contains any special characters like spaces and dots.
#
# \$hdrfrom_notify_sender = “amavisd-new “;
# \$hdrfrom_notify_sender = ‘amavisd-new ‘;
# \$hdrfrom_notify_sender = ‘”Content-Filter Master” ‘;
# (defaults to: “amavisd-new “)
# \$hdrfrom_notify_admin = \$mailfrom_notify_admin;
# (defaults to: \$mailfrom_notify_admin)
# \$hdrfrom_notify_spamadmin = \$mailfrom_notify_spamadmin;
# (defaults to: \$mailfrom_notify_spamadmin)

# whom quarantined messages appear to be sent from (envelope sender);
# keeps original sender if undef, or set it explicitly, default is undef
\$mailfrom_to_quarantine = ”; # override sender address with null return path

# Location to put infected mail into: (applies to ‘local:’ quarantine method)
# empty for not quarantining, may be a file (mailbox),
# or a directory (no trailing slash)
# (the default value is undef, meaning no quarantine)
#
\$QUARANTINEDIR = ‘/var/lib/amavis/virusmails’;

#\$virus_quarantine_method = “local:virus-%i-%n”; # default
#\$spam_quarantine_method = “local:spam-%b-%i-%n”; # default
#
#use the new ‘bsmtp:’ method as an alternative to the default ‘local:’
#\$virus_quarantine_method = “bsmtp:\$QUARANTINEDIR/virus-%i-%n.bsmtp”;
#\$spam_quarantine_method = “bsmtp:\$QUARANTINEDIR/spam-%b-%i-%n.bsmtp”;

# When using the ‘local:’ quarantine method (default), the following applies:
#
# A finer control of quarantining is available through variable
# \$virus_quarantine_to/\$spam_quarantine_to. It may be a simple scalar string,
# or a ref to a hash lookup table, or a regexp lookup table object,
# which makes possible to set up per-recipient quarantine addresses.
#
# The value of scalar \$virus_quarantine_to/\$spam_quarantine_to (or a
# per-recipient lookup result from the hash table %\$virus_quarantine_to)
# is/are interpreted as follows:
#
# VARIANT 1:
# empty or undef disables quarantine;
#
# VARIANT 2:
# a string NOT containing an ‘@’;
# amavisd will behave as a local delivery agent (LDA) and will quarantine
# viruses to local files according to hash %local_delivery_aliases (pseudo
# aliases map) – see subroutine mail_to_local_mailbox() for details.
# Some of the predefined aliases are ‘virus-quarantine’ and ‘spam-quarantine’.
# Setting \$virus_quarantine_to (\$spam_quarantine_to) to this string will:
#
# * if \$QUARANTINEDIR is a directory, each quarantined virus will go
# to a separate file in the \$QUARANTINEDIR directory (traditional
# amavis style, similar to maildir mailbox format);
#
# * otherwise \$QUARANTINEDIR is treated as a file name of a Unix-style
# mailbox. All quarantined messages will be appended to this file.
# Amavisd child process must obtain an exclusive lock on the file during
# delivery, so this may be less efficient than using individual files
# or forwarding to MTA, and it may not work across NFS or other non-local
# file systems (but may be handy for pickup of quarantined files via IMAP
# for example);
#
# VARIANT 3:
# any email address (must contain ‘@’).
# The e-mail messages to be quarantined will be handed to MTA
# for delivery to the specified address. If a recipient address local to MTA
# is desired, you may leave the domain part empty, e.g. ‘infected@’, but the
# ‘@’ character must nevertheless be included to distinguish it from variant 2.
#
# This method enables more refined delivery control made available by MTA
# (e.g. its aliases file, other local delivery agents, dealing with
# privileges and file locking when delivering to user’s mailbox, nonlocal
# delivery and forwarding, fan-out lists). Make sure the mail-to-be-quarantined
# will not be handed back to amavisd for checking, as this will cause a loop
# (hopefully broken at some stage)! If this can be assured, notifications
# will benefit too from not being unnecessarily virus-scanned.
#
# By default this is safe to do with Postfix and Exim v4 and dual-sendmail
# setup, but probably not safe with sendmail milter interface without
# precaution.

# (the default value is undef, meaning no quarantine)

\$virus_quarantine_to = ‘virus-quarantine’; # traditional local quarantine
#\$virus_quarantine_to = ‘infected@’; # forward to MTA for delivery
#\$virus_quarantine_to = “virus-quarantine\@\$mydomain”; # similar
#\$virus_quarantine_to = ‘virus-quarantine@example.com’; # similar
#\$virus_quarantine_to = undef; # no quarantine
#
#\$virus_quarantine_to = new_RE( # per-recip multiple quarantines
# [qr'^user@example\.com\$'i => 'infected@'],
# [qr'^(.*)@example\.com\$'i => 'virus-\${1}@example.com'],
# [qr'^(.*)(@[^@])?\$’i => ‘virus-\${1}\${2}’],
# [qr/.*/ => 'virus-quarantine'] );

# similar for spam
# (the default value is undef, meaning no quarantine)
#
\$spam_quarantine_to = ‘spam-quarantine’;
#\$spam_quarantine_to = “spam-quarantine\@\$mydomain”;
#\$spam_quarantine_to = new_RE( # per-recip multiple quarantines
# [qr'^(.*)@example\.com\$'i => 'spam-\${1}@example.com'],
# [qr/.*/ => 'spam-quarantine'] );

# In addition to per-recip quarantine, a by-sender lookup is possible. It is
# similar to \$spam_quarantine_to, but the lookup key is the sender address:
#\$spam_quarantine_bysender_to = undef; # dflt: no by-sender spam quarantine

# Add X-Virus-Scanned header field to mail?
\$X_HEADER_TAG = ‘X-Virus-Scanned’; # (default: undef)
# Leave empty to add no header # (default: undef)
\$X_HEADER_LINE = “by \$myversion (Debian) at \$mydomain”;

# a string to prepend to Subject (for local recipients only) if mail could
# not be decoded or checked entirely, e.g. due to password-protected archives
\$undecipherable_subject_tag = ‘***UNCHECKED*** ‘; # undef disables it

\$remove_existing_x_scanned_headers = 0; # leave existing X-Virus-Scanned alone
#\$remove_existing_x_scanned_headers= 1; # remove existing headers
# (defaults to false)
#\$remove_existing_spam_headers = 0; # leave existing X-Spam* headers alone
\$remove_existing_spam_headers = 1; # remove existing spam headers if
# spam scanning is enabled (default)

# set \$bypass_decode_parts to true if you only do spam scanning, or if you
# have a good virus scanner that can deal with compression and recursively
# unpacking archives by itself, and save amavisd the trouble.
# Disabling decoding also causes banned_files checking to only see
# MIME names and MIME content types, not the content classification types
# as provided by the file(1) utility.
# It is a double-edged sword, make sure you know what you are doing!
#
#\$bypass_decode_parts = 1; # (defaults to false)

# don’t trust this file type or corresponding unpacker for this file type,
# keep both the original and the unpacked file for a virus checker to see
# (lookup key is what file(1) utility returned):
#
\$keep_decoded_original_re = new_RE(
# qr’^MAIL\$’, # retain full original message for virus checking (can be slow)
qr’^MAIL-UNDECIPHERABLE\$’, # retain full mail if it contains undecipherables
qr’^(ASCII(?! cpio)|text|uuencoded|xxencoded|binhex)’i,
# qr’^Zip archive data’,
);

# Checking for banned MIME types and names. If any mail part matches,
# the whole mail is rejected, much like the way viruses are handled.
# A list in object \$banned_filename_re can be defined to provide a list
# of Perl regular expressions to be matched against each part’s:
#
# * Content-Type value (both declared and effective mime-type),
# including the possible security risk content types
# message/partial and message/external-body, as specified by rfc2046;
#
# * declared (i.e. recommended) file names as specified by MIME subfields
# Content-Disposition.filename and Content-Type.name, both in their
# raw (encoded) form and in rfc2047-decoded form if applicable;
#
# * file content type as guessed by ‘file’ utility, both the raw
# result from ‘file’, as well as short type name, classified
# into names such as .asc, .txt, .html, .doc, .jpg, .pdf,
# .zip, .exe, … – see subroutine determine_file_types().
# This step is done only if \$bypass_decode_parts is not true.
#
# * leave \$banned_filename_re undefined to disable these checks
# (giving an empty list to new_RE() will also always return false)

\$banned_filename_re = new_RE(
# qr’^UNDECIPHERABLE\$’, # is or contains any undecipherable components
qr’\.[^.]*\.(exe|vbs|pif|scr|bat|cmd|com|dll)\$’i, # some double extensions
qr’[{}]‘, # curly braces in names (serve as Class ID extensions – CLSID)
# qr’.\.(exe|vbs|pif|scr|bat|cmd|com)\$’i, # banned extension – basic
# qr’.\.(ade|adp|bas|bat|chm|cmd|com|cpl|crt|exe|hlp|hta|inf|ins|isp|js|
# jse|lnk|mdb|mde|msc|msi|msp|mst|pcd|pif|reg|scr|sct|shs|shb|vb|
# vbe|vbs|wsc|wsf|wsh)\$’ix, # banned extension – long
# qr’.\.(mim|b64|bhx|hqx|xxe|uu|uue)\$’i, # banned extension – WinZip vulnerab.
# qr’^\.(zip|lha|tnef|cab)\$’i, # banned file(1) types
# qr’^\.exe\$’i, # banned file(1) types
# qr’^application/x-msdownload\$’i, # banned MIME types
# qr’^application/x-msdos-program\$’i,
qr’^message/partial\$’i, # rfc2046. this one is deadly for Outcrook
# qr’^message/external-body\$’i, # block rfc2046
);
# See http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q262631
# and http://www.cknow.com/vtutor/vtextensions.htm

# A little trick: a pattern qr’\.exe\$’ matches both a short type name ‘.exe’,
# as well as any file name which happens to end with .exe. If only matching
# a file name is desired, but not the short name, a pattern qr’.\.exe\$’i
# or similar may be used, which requires that at least one character precedes
# the ‘.exe’, and so it will never match short file types, which always start
# with a dot.

#
# Section V – Per-recipient and per-sender handling, whitelisting, etc.
#

# %virus_lovers, @virus_lovers_acl and \$virus_lovers_re lookup tables:
# (these should be considered policy options, they do not disable checks,
# see bypass*checks for that!)
#
# Exclude certain RECIPIENTS from virus filtering by adding their lower-cased
# envelope e-mail address (or domain only) to the hash %virus_lovers, or to
# the access list @virus_lovers_acl – see README.lookups and examples.
# Make sure the appropriate form (e.g. external/internal) of address
# is used in case of virtual domains, or when mapping external to internal
# addresses, etc. – this is MTA-specific.
#
# Notifications would still be generated however (see the overall
# picture above), and infected mail (if passed) gets additional header:
# X-AMaViS-Alert: INFECTED, message contains virus: …
# (header not inserted with milter interface!)
#
# NOTE (milter interface only): in case of multiple recipients,
# it is only possible to drop or accept the message in its entirety – for all
# recipients. If all of them are virus lovers, we’ll accept mail, but if
# at least one recipient is not a virus lover, we’ll discard the message.

# %bypass_virus_checks, @bypass_virus_checks_acl and \$bypass_virus_checks_re
# lookup tables:
# (this is mainly a time-saving option, unlike virus_lovers* !)
#
# Similar in concept to %virus_lovers, a hash %bypass_virus_checks,
# access list @bypass_virus_checks_acl and regexp list \$bypass_virus_checks_re
# are used to skip entirely the decoding, unpacking and virus checking,
# but only if ALL recipients match the lookup.
#
# %bypass_virus_checks/@bypass_virus_checks_acl/\$bypass_virus_checks_re
# do NOT GUARANTEE the message will NOT be checked for viruses – this may
# still happen when there is more than one recipient for a message, and
# not all of them match these lookup tables. To guarantee virus delivery,
# a recipient must also match %virus_lovers/@virus_lovers_acl lookups
# (but see milter limitations above),

# NOTE: it would not be clever to base virus checks on SENDER address,
# since there are no guarantees that it is genuine. Many viruses
# and spam messages fake sender address. To achieve selective filtering
# based on the source of the mail (e.g. IP address, MTA port number, …),
# use mechanisms provided by MTA if available.

# Similar to lookup tables controlling virus checking, there exist
# spam scanning, banned names/types, and headers_checks control counterparts:
# %spam_lovers, @spam_lovers_acl, \$spam_lovers_re
# %banned_files_lovers, @banned_files_lovers_acl, \$banned_files_lovers_re
# %bad_header_lovers, @bad_header_lovers_acl, \$bad_header_lovers_re
# and:
# %bypass_spam_checks/@bypass_spam_checks_acl/\$bypass_spam_checks_re
# %bypass_banned_checks/@bypass_banned_checks_acl/\$bypass_banned_checks_re
# %bypass_header_checks/@bypass_header_checks_acl/\$bypass_header_checks_re
# See README.lookups for details about the syntax.

# The following example disables spam checking altogether,
# since it matches any recipient e-mail address (any address
# is a subdomain of the top-level root DNS domain):
# @bypass_spam_checks_acl = qw( . );

# @bypass_header_checks_acl = qw( user@example.com );
# @bad_header_lovers_acl = qw( user@example.com );

# See README.lookups for further detail, and examples below.

# \$virus_lovers{lc(“postmaster\@\$mydomain”)} = 1;
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘postmaster@example.com’)} = 1;
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘abuse@example.com’)} = 1;
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘some.user@’)} = 1; # this recipient, regardless of domain
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘boss@example.com’)} = 0; # never, even if domain matches
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘example.com’)} = 1; # this domain, but not its subdomains
# \$virus_lovers{lc(‘.example.com’)}= 1; # this domain, including its subdomains
#or:
# @virus_lovers_acl = qw( me@lab.xxx.com !lab.xxx.com .xxx.com yyy.org );
#
# \$bypass_virus_checks{lc(‘some.user2@butnot.example.com’)} = 1;
# @bypass_virus_checks_acl = qw( some.ddd !butnot.example.com .example.com );

# @virus_lovers_acl = qw( postmaster@example.com );
# \$virus_lovers_re = new_RE( qr’^(helpdesk|postmaster)@example\.com\$’i );

# \$spam_lovers{lc(“postmaster\@\$mydomain”)} = 1;
# \$spam_lovers{lc(‘postmaster@example.com’)} = 1;
# \$spam_lovers{lc(‘abuse@example.com’)} = 1;
# @spam_lovers_acl = qw( !.example.com );
# \$spam_lovers_re = new_RE( qr’^user@example\.com\$’i );

# don’t run spam check for these RECIPIENT domains:
# @bypass_spam_checks_acl = qw( d1.com .d2.com a.d3.com );
# or the other way around (bypass check for all BUT these):
# @bypass_spam_checks_acl = qw( !d1.com !.d2.com !a.d3.com . );
# a practical application: don’t check outgoing mail for spam:
# @bypass_spam_checks_acl = ( “!.\$mydomain”, “.” );
# (a downside of which is that such mail will not count as ham in SA bayes db)

# Where to find SQL server(s) and database to support SQL lookups?
# A list of triples: (dsn,user,passw). (dsn = data source name)
# More than one entry may be specified for multiple (backup) SQL servers.
# See ‘man DBI’, ‘man DBD::mysql’, ‘man DBD::Pg’, … for details.
# When chroot-ed, accessing SQL server over inet socket may be more convenient.
#
# @lookup_sql_dsn =
# ( ['DBI:mysql:database=mail;host=127.0.0.1;port=3306', 'user1', 'passwd1'],
# ['DBI:mysql:database=mail;host=host2', 'username2', 'password2'] );
#
# (‘mail’ in the example is the database name, choose what you like)
# With PostgreSQL the dsn (first element of the triple) may look like:
# ‘DBI:Pg:host=host1;dbname=mail’

# The SQL select clause to fetch per-recipient policy settings.
# The %k will be replaced by a comma-separated list of query addresses
# (e.g. full address, domain only, catchall). Use ORDER, if there
# is a chance that multiple records will match – the first match wins.
# If field names are not unique (e.g. ‘id’), the later field overwrites the
# earlier in a hash returned by lookup, which is why we use ‘*,users.id’.
# \$sql_select_policy = ‘SELECT *,users.id FROM users,policy’.
# ‘ WHERE (users.policy_id=policy.id) AND (users.email IN (%k))’.
# ‘ ORDER BY users.priority DESC’;
#
# The SQL select clause to check sender in per-recipient whitelist/blacklist
# The first SELECT argument ‘?’ will be users.id from recipient SQL lookup,
# the %k will be sender addresses (e.g. full address, domain only, catchall).
# \$sql_select_white_black_list = ‘SELECT wb FROM wblist,mailaddr’.
# ‘ WHERE (wblist.rid=?) AND (wblist.sid=mailaddr.id)’.
# ‘ AND (mailaddr.email IN (%k))’.
# ‘ ORDER BY mailaddr.priority DESC’;

\$sql_select_white_black_list = undef; # undef disables SQL white/blacklisting

# If you decide to pass viruses (or spam) to certain recipients using the
# above lookup tables or using \$final_virus_destiny=D_PASS, you can set
# the variable \$addr_extension_virus (\$addr_extension_spam) to some
# string, and the recipient address will have this string appended
# as an address extension to the local-part of the address. This extension
# can be used by final local delivery agent to place such mail in different
# folders. Leave these two variables undefined or empty strings to prevent
# appending address extensions. Setting has no effect on recipient which will
# not be receiving viruses/spam. Recipients who do not match lookup tables
# local_domains* are not affected.
#
# LDAs usually default to stripping away address extension if no special
# handling is specified, so having this option enabled normally does no harm,
# provided the \$recipients_delimiter matches the setting on the final
# MTA’s LDA.

# \$addr_extension_virus = ‘virus’; # (default is undef, same as empty)
# \$addr_extension_spam = ‘spam’; # (default is undef, same as empty)
# \$addr_extension_banned = ‘banned’; # (default is undef, same as empty)

# Delimiter between local part of the recipient address and address extension
# (which can optionally be added, see variables \$addr_extension_virus and
# \$addr_extension_spam). E.g. recipient address gets changed
# to .
#
# Delimiter should match equivalent (final) MTA delimiter setting.
# (e.g. for Postfix add ‘recipient_delimiter = +’ to main.cf)
# Setting it to an empty string or to undef disables this feature
# regardless of \$addr_extension_virus and \$addr_extension_spam settings.

\$recipient_delimiter = ‘+’; # (default is ‘+’)

# true: replace extension; false: append extension
\$replace_existing_extension = 1; # (default is false)

# Affects matching of localpart of e-mail addresses (left of ‘@’)
# in lookups: true = case sensitive, false = case insensitive
\$localpart_is_case_sensitive = 0; # (default is false)

# ENVELOPE SENDER WHITELISTING / BLACKLISTING – GLOBAL (RECIPIENT-INDEPENDENT)
# (affects spam checking only, has no effect on virus and other checks)

# WHITELISTING: use ENVELOPE SENDER lookups to ENSURE DELIVERY from whitelisted
# senders even if the message would be recognized as spam. Effectively, for
# the specified senders, message recipients temporarily become ‘spam_lovers’.
# To avoid surprises, whitelisted sender also suppresses inserting/editing
# the tag2-level header fields (X-Spam-*, Subject), appending spam address
# extension, and quarantining.

# BLACKLISTING: messages from specified SENDERS are DECLARED SPAM.
# Effectively, for messages from blacklisted senders, spam level
# is artificially pushed high, and the normal spam processing applies,
# resulting in ‘X-Spam-Flag: YES’, high ‘X-Spam-Level’ bar and other usual
# reactions to spam, including possible rejection. If the message nevertheless
# still passes (e.g. for spam loving recipients), it is tagged as BLACKLISTED
# in the ‘X-Spam-Status’ header field, but the reported spam value and
# set of tests in this report header field (if available from SpamAssassin,
# which may have not been called) is not adjusted.
#
# A sender may be both white- and blacklisted at the same time, settings
# are independent. For example, being both white- and blacklisted, message
# is delivered to recipients, but is not tagged as spam (X-Spam-Flag: No;
# X-Spam-Status: No, …), but the reported spam level (if computed) may
# still indicate high spam score.
#
# If ALL recipients of the message either white- or blacklist the sender,
# spam scanning (calling the SpamAssassin) is bypassed, saving on time.
#
# The following variables (lookup tables) are available, with the semantics
# and syntax as specified in README.lookups:
#
# %whitelist_sender, @whitelist_sender_acl, \$whitelist_sender_re
# %blacklist_sender, @blacklist_sender_acl, \$blacklist_sender_re

# SOME EXAMPLES:
#
#ACL:
# @whitelist_sender_acl = qw( .example.com );
#
# @whitelist_sender_acl = ( “.\$mydomain” ); # \$mydomain and its subdomains
# NOTE: This is not a reliable way of turning off spam checks for
# locally-originating mail, as sender address can easily be faked.
# To reliably avoid spam-scanning outgoing mail,
# use @bypass_spam_checks_acl .

#RE:
# \$whitelist_sender_re = new_RE(
# qr’^postmaster@.*\bexample\.com\$’i,
# qr’owner-[^@]*@’i, qr’-request@’i,
# qr’\.example\.com\$’i );
#
\$blacklist_sender_re = new_RE(
qr’^(bulkmail|offers|cheapbenefits|earnmoney|foryou|greatcasino)@’i,
qr’^(investments|lose_weight_today|market\.alert|money2you|MyGreenCard)@’i,
qr’^(new\.tld\.registry|opt-out|opt-in|optin|saveonl|smoking2002k)@’i,
qr’^(specialoffer|specialoffers|stockalert|stopsnoring|wantsome)@’i,
qr’^(workathome|yesitsfree|your_friend|greatoffers)@’i,
qr’^(inkjetplanet|marketopt|MakeMoney)\d*@’i,
);

#HASH lookup variant:
# NOTE: Perl operator qw splits its argument string by whitespace
# and produces a list. This means that addresses can not contain
# whitespace, and there is no provision for comments within the string.
# You can use the normal Perl list syntax if you have special requirements,
# e.g. map {…} (‘one user@bla’, ‘.second.com’), or use read_hash to read
# addresses from a file.
#

# a hash lookup table can be read from a file,
# one address per line, comments and empty lines are permitted:
#
# read_hash(\%whitelist_sender, ‘/var/amavis/whitelist_sender’);

# … or set directly:
map { \$whitelist_sender{lc(\$_)}=1 } (qw(
nobody@cert.org
owner-alert@iss.net
slashdot@slashdot.org
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
NTBUGTRAQ@LISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
security-alerts@linuxsecurity.com
amavis-user-admin@lists.sourceforge.net
razor-users-admin@lists.sourceforge.net
notification-return@lists.sophos.com
mailman-announce-admin@python.org
zope-announce-admin@zope.org
owner-postfix-users@postfix.org
owner-postfix-announce@postfix.org
owner-sendmail-announce@lists.sendmail.org
sendmail-announce-request@lists.sendmail.org
ca+envelope@sendmail.org
owner-technews@postel.ACM.ORG
lvs-users-admin@LinuxVirtualServer.org
ietf-123-owner@loki.ietf.org
cvs-commits-list-admin@gnome.org
rt-users-admin@lists.fsck.com
owner-announce@mnogosearch.org
owner-hackers@ntp.org
owner-bugs@ntp.org
clp-request@comp.nus.edu.sg
surveys-errors@lists.nua.ie
emailNews@genomeweb.com
owner-textbreakingnews@CNNIMAIL12.CNN.COM
yahoo-dev-null@yahoo-inc.com
));

# ENVELOPE SENDER WHITELISTING / BLACKLISTING – PER-RECIPIENT

# The same semantics as for global white/blacklisting applies, but this
# time each recipient (or its domain, or subdomain, …) can be given
# an individual lookup table for matching senders. The per-recipient lookups
# override the global lookups, which serve as a fallback default.

# Specify a two-level lookup table: the key for the outer table is recipient,
# and the result should be an inner lookup table (hash or ACL or RE),
# where the key used will be the sender.
#
#\$per_recip_blacklist_sender_lookup_tables = {
# ‘user1@my.example.com’=>new_RE(qr’^(inkjetplanet|marketopt|MakeMoney)\d*@’i),
# ‘user2@my.example.com’=>[qw( spammer@d1.example,org .d2.example,org )],
#};
#\$per_recip_whitelist_sender_lookup_tables = {
# ‘user@my.example.com’ => [qw( friend@example.org .other.example.org )],
# ‘.my1.example.com’ => [qw( !foe.other.example,org .other.example,org )],
# ‘.my2.example.com’ => read_hash(‘/var/amavis/my2-wl.dat’),
# ‘abuse@’ => { ‘postmaster@’=>1,
# ‘cert-advisory-owner@cert.org’=>1, ‘owner-alert@iss.net’=>1 },
#};

#
# Section VI – Resource limits
#

# Sanity limit to the number of allowed recipients per SMTP transaction
# \$smtpd_recipient_limit = 1000; # (default is 1000)

# Resource limits to protect unpackers, decompressors and virus scanners
# against mail bombs (e.g. 42.zip)

# Maximum recursion level for extraction/decoding (0 or undef disables limit)
\$MAXLEVELS = 14; # (default is undef, no limit)

# Maximum number of extracted files (0 or undef disables the limit)
\$MAXFILES = 1500; # (default is undef, no limit)

# For the cumulative total of all decoded mail parts we set max storage size
# to defend against mail bombs. Even though parts may be deleted (replaced
# by decoded text) during decoding, the size they occupied is _not_ returned
# to the quota pool.
#
# Parameters to storage quota formula for unpacking/decoding/decompressing
# Formula:
# quota = max(\$MIN_EXPANSION_QUOTA,
# \$mail_size*\$MIN_EXPANSION_FACTOR,
# min(\$MAX_EXPANSION_QUOTA, \$mail_size*\$MAX_EXPANSION_FACTOR))
# In plain words (later condition overrules previous ones):
# allow MAX_EXPANSION_FACTOR times initial mail size,
# but not more than MAX_EXPANSION_QUOTA,
# but not less than MIN_EXPANSION_FACTOR times initial mail size,
# but never less than MIN_EXPANSION_QUOTA
#
\$MIN_EXPANSION_QUOTA = 100*1024; # bytes (default undef, not enforced)
\$MAX_EXPANSION_QUOTA = 300*1024*1024; # bytes (default undef, not enforced)
\$MIN_EXPANSION_FACTOR = 5; # times original mail size (must be specified)
\$MAX_EXPANSION_FACTOR = 500; # times original mail size (must be specified)

#
# Section VII – External programs, virus scanners
#

# Specify a path string, which is a colon-separated string of directories
# (no trailing slashes!) to be assigned to the environment variable PATH
# and to serve for locating external programs below.

# NOTE: if \$daemon_chroot_dir is nonempty, the directories will be
# relative to the chroot directory specified;

\$path = ‘/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin’;

# Specify one string or a search list of strings (first match wins).
# The string (or: each string in a list) may be an absolute path,
# or just a program name, to be located via \$path;
# Empty string or undef (=default) disables the use of that external program.
# Optionally command arguments may be specified – only the first substring
# up to the whitespace is used for file searching.

\$file = ‘file’; # file(1) utility; use 3.41 or later to avoid vulnerability

\$gzip = ‘gzip’;
\$bzip2 = ‘bzip2′;
\$lzop = ‘lzop’;
\$uncompress = ['uncompress', 'gzip -d', 'zcat'];
\$unfreeze = ['unfreeze', 'freeze -d', 'melt', 'fcat'];
\$arc = ['nomarch', 'arc'];
\$unarj = ['arj', 'unarj']; # both can extract, arj is recommended
\$unrar = ['rar', 'unrar']; # both can extract, same options
\$zoo = ‘zoo’;
\$lha = ‘lha’;
\$cpio = ‘cpio’; # comment out if cpio does not support GNU options

# SpamAssassin settings

# \$sa_local_tests_only is passed to Mail::SpamAssassin::new as a value
# of the option local_tests_only. See Mail::SpamAssassin man page.
# If set to 1, SA tests are restricted to local tests only, i.e. no tests
# that require internet access will be performed.
#
\$sa_local_tests_only = 1; # (default: false)
#\$sa_auto_whitelist = 1; # turn on AWL (default: false)

# Timout for SpamAssassin. This is only used if spamassassin does NOT
# override it (which it often does if sa_local_tests_only is not true)
\$sa_timeout = 30; # timeout in seconds for a call to SpamAssassin
# (default is 30 seconds, undef disables it)

# AWL (auto whitelisting), requires spamassassin 2.44 or better
# \$sa_auto_whitelist = 1; # defaults to undef

\$sa_mail_body_size_limit = 150*1024; # don’t waste time on SA is mail is larger
# (less than 1% of spam is > 64k)
# default: undef, no limitations

# default values, can be overridden by more specific lookups, e.g. SQL
\$sa_tag_level_deflt = 4.0; # add spam info headers if at, or above that level
\$sa_tag2_level_deflt = 6.3; # add ‘spam detected’ headers at that level
\$sa_kill_level_deflt = \$sa_tag2_level_deflt; # triggers spam evasive actions
# at or above that level: bounce/reject/drop,
# quarantine, and adding mail address extension

\$sa_dsn_cutoff_level = 10; # spam level beyond which a DSN is not sent,
# effectively turning D_BOUNCE into D_DISCARD;
# undef disables this feature and is a default;

#
# The \$sa_tag_level_deflt, \$sa_tag2_level_deflt and \$sa_kill_level_deflt
# may also be hashrefs to hash lookup tables, to make static per-recipient
# settings possible without having to resort to SQL or LDAP lookups.

# a quick reference:
# tag_level controls adding the X-Spam-Status and X-Spam-Level headers,
# tag2_level controls adding ‘X-Spam-Flag: YES’, and editing Subject,
# kill_level controls ‘evasive actions’ (reject, quarantine, extensions);
# it only makes sense to maintain the relationship:
# tag_level ]*>clean/,
# qr/(?i)]*>infected/,
# qr/(?i)(.+)/ ],

['KasperskyLab AVP - aveclient',
['/usr/local/kav/bin/aveclient','/usr/local/share/kav/bin/aveclient',
'/opt/kav/bin/aveclient','aveclient'],
‘-p /var/run/aveserver -s {}/*’, [0,3,6,8], qr/\b(INFECTED|SUSPICION)\b/,
qr/(?:INFECTED|SUSPICION) (.+)/,
],

['KasperskyLab AntiViral Toolkit Pro (AVP)', ['avp'],
‘-* -P -B -Y -O- {}’, [0,8,16,24], [2,3,4,5,6, 18,19,20,21,22],
qr/infected: (.+)/,
sub {chdir(‘/opt/AVP’) or die “Can’t chdir to AVP: \$!”},
sub {chdir(\$TEMPBASE) or die “Can’t chdir back to \$TEMPBASE \$!”},
],

### The kavdaemon and AVPDaemonClient have been removed from Kasperky
### products and replaced by aveserver and aveclient
['KasperskyLab AVPDaemonClient',
[ '/opt/AVP/kavdaemon', 'kavdaemon',
'/opt/AVP/AvpDaemonClient', 'AvpDaemonClient',
'/opt/AVP/AvpTeamDream', 'AvpTeamDream',
'/opt/AVP/avpdc', 'avpdc' ],
“-f=\$TEMPBASE {}”, [0,8,16,24], [2,3,4,5,6, 18,19,20,21,22],
qr/infected: ([^\r\n]+)/ ],
# change the startup-script in /etc/init.d/kavd to:
# DPARMS=”-* -Y -dl -f=/var/amavis /var/amavis”
# (or perhaps: DPARMS=”-I0 -Y -* /var/amavis” )
# adjusting /var/amavis above to match your \$TEMPBASE.
# The ‘-f=/var/amavis’ is needed if not running it as root, so it
# can find, read, and write its pid file, etc., see ‘man kavdaemon’.
# defUnix.prf: there must be an entry “*/var/amavis” (or whatever
# directory \$TEMPBASE specifies) in the ‘Names=’ section.
# cd /opt/AVP/DaemonClients; configure; cd Sample; make
# cp AvpDaemonClient /opt/AVP/
# su – vscan -c “\${PREFIX}/kavdaemon \${DPARMS}”

### http://www.hbedv.com/ or http://www.centralcommand.com/
['H+BEDV AntiVir or CentralCommand Vexira Antivirus',
['antivir','vexira'],
‘–allfiles -noboot -nombr -rs -s -z {}’, [0], qr/ALERT:|VIRUS:/,
qr/(?x)^\s* (?: ALERT: \s* (?: \[ | [^']* ‘ ) |
(?i) VIRUS:\ .*?\ virus\ ‘?) ( [^\]\s’]+ )/ ],
# NOTE: if you only have a demo version, remove -z and add 214, as in:
# ‘–allfiles -noboot -nombr -rs -s {}’, [0,214], qr/ALERT:|VIRUS:/,

### http://www.commandsoftware.com/
['Command AntiVirus for Linux', 'csav',
'-all -archive -packed {}', [50], [51,52,53],
qr/Infection: (.+)/ ],

### http://www.symantec.com/
['Symantec CarrierScan via Symantec CommandLineScanner',
'cscmdline', '-a scan -i 1 -v -s 127.0.0.1:7777 {}',
qr/^Files Infected:\s+0\$/, qr/^Infected\b/,
qr/^(?:Info|Virus Name):\s+(.+)/ ],

### http://www.symantec.com/
['Symantec AntiVirus Scan Engine',
'savsecls', '-server 127.0.0.1:7777 -mode scanrepair -details -verbose {}',
[0], qr/^Infected\b/,
qr/^(?:Info|Virus Name):\s+(.+)/ ],
# NOTE: check options and patterns to see which entry better applies

### http://www.sald.com/, http://drweb.imshop.de/
['drweb - DrWeb Antivirus',
['/usr/local/drweb/drweb', '/opt/drweb/drweb', 'drweb'],
‘-path={} -al -go -ot -cn -upn -ok-’,
[0,32], [1,33], qr’ infected (?:with|by)(?: virus)? (.*)\$’],

# ### http://www.sald.com/, http://www.dials.ru/english/, http://www.drweb.ru/
# ['DrWebD', \&ask_daemon, # DrWebD 4.31 or later
# [pack('N',1). # DRWEBD_SCAN_CMD
# pack('N',0x00280001). # DONT_CHANGEMAIL, IS_MAIL, RETURN_VIRUSES
# pack('N', # path length
# length("\$TEMPBASE/amavis-yyyymmddTHHMMSS-xxxxx/parts/part-xxxxx")).
# '{}/*'. # path
# pack('N',0). # content size
# pack('N',0),
# '/var/drweb/run/drwebd.sock',
# # '/var/amavis/var/run/drwebd.sock', # suitable for chroot
# # '/usr/local/drweb/run/drwebd.sock', # FreeBSD drweb ports default
# # '127.0.0.1:3000', # or over an inet socket
# ],
# qr/\A\x00(\x10|\x11)\x00\x00/s, # IS_CLEAN, EVAL_KEY
# qr/\A\x00(\x00|\x01)\x00(\x20|\x40|\x80)/s, # KNOWN_V, UNKNOWN_V, V._MODIF
# qr/\A.{12}(?:infected with )?([^\x00]+)\x00/s,
# ],
# # NOTE: If you are using amavis-milter, change length to:
# # length(“\$TEMPBASE/amavis-milter-xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/parts/part-xxxxx”).

### http://www.f-secure.com/products/anti-virus/
['F-Secure Antivirus', 'fsav',
'--dumb --mime --archive {}', [0], [3,8],
qr/(?:infection|Infected|Suspected): (.+)/ ],

['CAI InoculateIT', 'inocucmd',
'-sec -nex {}', [0], [100],
qr/was infected by virus (.+)/ ],

['MkS_Vir for Linux (beta)', ['mks32','mks'],
‘-s {}/*’, [0], [1,2], # any use for options: -a -c ?
qr/–[ \t]*(.+)/ ],

### http://www.nod32.com/
['ESET Software NOD32', 'nod32',
'-all -subdir+ {}', [0], [1,2],
qr/^.+? – (.+?)\s*(?:backdoor|joke|trojan|virus|worm)/ ],

### http://www.nod32.com/
['ESET Software NOD32 - Client/Server Version', 'nod32cli',
'-a -r -d recurse --heur standard {}', [0], [10,11],
qr/^\S+\s+infected:\s+(.+)/ ],

### http://www.norman.com/products_nvc.shtml
['Norman Virus Control v5 / Linux', 'nvcc',
'-c -l:0 -s -u {}', [0], [1],
qr/(?i).* virus in .* -> \’(.+)\’/ ],

### http://www.pandasoftware.com/
['Panda Antivirus for Linux', ['pavcl'],
‘-aut -aex -heu -cmp -nbr -nor -nso -eng {}’,
qr/Number of files infected[ .]*: 0(?!\d)/,
qr/Number of files infected[ .]*: 0*[1-9]/,
qr/Found virus :\s*(\S+)/ ],

# GeCAD AV technology is acquired by Microsoft; RAV has been discontinued.
# Check your RAV license terms before fiddling with the following two lines!
# ['GeCAD RAV AntiVirus 8', 'ravav',
# '--all --archive --mail {}', [1], [2,3,4,5], qr/Infected: (.+)/ ],
# # NOTE: the command line switches changed with scan engine 8.5 !
# # (btw, assigning stdin to /dev/null causes RAV to fail)

### http://www.nai.com/
['NAI McAfee AntiVirus (uvscan)', 'uvscan',
'--secure -rv --mime --summary --noboot - {}', [0], [13],
qr/(?x) Found (?:
\ the\ (.+)\ (?:virus|trojan) |
\ (?:virus|trojan)\ or\ variant\ ([^ ]+) |
:\ (.+)\ NOT\ a\ virus)/,
# sub {\$ENV{LD_PRELOAD}=’/lib/libc.so.6′},
# sub {delete \$ENV{LD_PRELOAD}},
],
# NOTE1: with RH9: force the dynamic linker to look at /lib/libc.so.6 before
# anything else by setting environment variable LD_PRELOAD=/lib/libc.so.6
# and then clear it when finished to avoid confusing anything else.
# NOTE2: to treat encrypted files as viruses replace the [13] with:
# qr/^\s{5,}(Found|is password-protected|.*(virus|trojan))/

### http://www.virusbuster.hu/en/
['VirusBuster', ['vbuster', 'vbengcl'],
# VirusBuster Ltd. does not support the daemon version for the workstation
# engine (vbuster-eng-1.12-linux-i386-libc6.tgz) any longer. The names of
# binaries, some parameters AND return codes (from 3 to 1) changed.
“{} -ss -i ‘*’ -log=\$MYHOME/vbuster.log”, [0], [1],
qr/: ‘(.*)’ – Virus/ ],

# ### http://www.virusbuster.hu/en/
# ['VirusBuster (Client + Daemon)', 'vbengd',
# # HINT: for an infected file it returns always 3,
# # although the man-page tells a different story
# '-f -log scandir {}', [0], [3],
# qr/Virus found = (.*);/ ],

### http://www.cyber.com/
['CyberSoft VFind', 'vfind',
'--vexit {}/*', [0], [23], qr/##==>>>> VIRUS ID: CVDL (.+)/,
# sub {\$ENV{VSTK_HOME}=’/usr/lib/vstk’},
],

### http://www.ikarus-software.com/
['Ikarus AntiVirus for Linux', 'ikarus',
'{}', [0], [40], qr/Signature (.+) found/ ],

### http://www.bitdefender.com/
['BitDefender', 'bdc',
'--all --arc --mail {}', qr/^Infected files *:0(?!\d)/,
qr/^(?:Infected files|Identified viruses|Suspect files) *:0*[1-9]/,
qr/(?:suspected|infected): (.*)(?:33|\$)/ ],

### F-Prot http://www.f-prot.com
['FRISK F-Prot Antivirus', ['f-prot','/usr/lib/f-prot/f-prot.sh'],
‘-dumb -archive -packed {}’, [0,8], [3,6],
qr/Infection: (.+)|\s+contains\s+(.+)\$/ ],
);

# If no virus scanners from the @av_scanners list produce ‘clean’ nor
# ‘infected’ status (e.g. they all fail to run or the list is empty),
# then _all_ scanners from the @av_scanners_backup list are tried.
# When there are both daemonized and command-line scanners available,
# it is customary to place slower command-line scanners in the
# @av_scanners_backup list. The default choice is somewhat arbitrary,
# move entries from one list to another as desired.

@av_scanners_backup = (

### http://www.clamav.net/
['Clam Antivirus - clamscan', 'clamscan',
"--stdout --no-summary -r --tempdir=\$TEMPBASE {}", [0], [1],
qr/^.*?: (?!Infected Archive)(.*) FOUND\$/ ],

### http://www.f-prot.com/
['FRISK F-Prot Antivirus', ['f-prot','f-prot.sh'],
‘-dumb -archive -packed {}’, [0,8], [3,6],
qr/Infection: (.+)/ ],

### http://www.trendmicro.com/
['Trend Micro FileScanner', ['/etc/iscan/vscan','vscan'],
‘-za -a {}’, [0], qr/Found virus/, qr/Found virus (.+) in/ ],

['KasperskyLab kavscanner', ['/opt/kav/bin/kavscanner','kavscanner'],
‘-i1 -xp {}’, [0,10,15], [5,20,21,25],
qr/(?:CURED|INFECTED|CUREFAILED|WARNING|SUSPICION) (.*)/ ,
sub {chdir(‘/opt/kav/bin’) or die “Can’t chdir to kav: \$!”},
sub {chdir(\$TEMPBASE) or die “Can’t chdir back to \$TEMPBASE \$!”},
],

# Commented out because the name ‘sweep’ clashes with the Debian package of
# the same name. Make sure the correct sweep is found in the path when enabling
#
# ### http://www.sophos.com/
# ['Sophos Anti Virus (sweep)', 'sweep',
# '-nb -f -all -rec -ss -sc -archive -cab -tnef --no-reset-atime {}',
# [0,2], qr/Virus .*? found/,
# qr/^>>> Virus(?: fragment)? ‘?(.*?)’? found/,
# ],
# # other options to consider: -mime -oe -idedir=/usr/local/sav

# always succeeds (uncomment to consider mail clean if all other scanners fail)
# ['always-clean', sub {0}],

);

#
# Section VIII – Debugging
#

# The most useful debugging tool is to run amavisd-new non-detached
# from a terminal window:
# amavisd debug

# Some more refined approaches:

# If sender matches ACL, turn log level fully up, just for this one message,
# and preserve temporary directory
#@debug_sender_acl = ( “test-sender\@\$mydomain” );
#@debug_sender_acl = qw( debug@example.com );

# May be useful along with @debug_sender_acl:
# Prevent all decoded originals being deleted (replaced by decoded part)
#\$keep_decoded_original_re = new_RE( qr/.*/ );

# Turn on SpamAssassin debugging (output to STDERR, use with ‘amavisd debug’)
#\$sa_debug = 1; # defaults to false

#————-
1; # insure a defined return

EOF

echo -e “Re-iniciando o amavis”\\m

/etc/init.d/amavis restart

# Dando uma olhada no syslog
tail -n 10 /var/log/syslog

echo -e \\n
echo -e “Pronto, seu Clamav {http://www.clamav.net/} foi atualizado e adicionamos o Anti-Vírus F-Prot “
echo -e “{http://www.f-prot.com.pt/} para melhor proteção”\\n
echo -e “O seguinte conteudo foi adicionado ao seu /etc/amavis/amavisd.conf:”
echo -e “
### F-Prot http://www.f-prot.com
['FRISK F-Prot Antivirus', ['f-prot','/usr/lib/f-prot/f-prot.sh'],
‘-dumb -archive -packed {}’, [0,8], [3,6],
qr/Infection: (.+)|\s+contains\s+(.+)\$/ ],
“\\n

echo -e “Para instalar outros software adicionais e melhorar a segurança do sistema,”
echo -e “recomendamos dar uma olhada em http://www.howtoforge.com/postfix_amavisd_antispam”\\n